Abstract. In ISNN'04, a novel symmetric cipher was proposed, by combining a chaotic signal and a clipped neural network (CNN) for encryption. The present paper analyzes the security of this chaotic cipher against chosen-plaintext attacks, and points out that this cipher can be broken by a chosen-plaintext attack. Experimental analyses are given to support the feasibility of the proposed attack.
Introduction
Since the 1990s, the study of using chaotic systems to design new ciphers has become intensive [1] . In particular, the idea of combining chaos and neural networks has been developed [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] and has been adopted for image and video encryption [6] , [7] . In our recent work [8] , it has been shown that the chaotic ciphers designed in [2] , [3] , [4] , [6] , [7] are not sufficiently secure from a cryptographical point of view. This paper focuses on the security of a clipped-neural-network-based chaotic cipher proposed in ISNN'04 [5] . This chaotic cipher employs a chaotic pseudorandom signal and the output of a 8-cell clipped neural network to mask the plaintext, along with modulus additions and XOR operations. Also, the evolution of the neural network is controlled by the chaotic signal. With such a complicated combination, it was hoped that the chaotic cipher can resist chosenplaintext attacks. Unfortunately, our analysis shows that it is still not secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. By choosing only two plaintexts, an attacker can derive an equivalent key to break the cipher. This paper reports our analyses and simulation results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief introduction to the chaotic cipher under study. The proposed chosen-plaintext attack is described in detail in Sec. 3, with some experimental results. The last section concludes the paper.
The CNN-Based Chaotic Cipher
First, the CNN employed in the chaotic cipher is introduced. The neural network contains 8 neural cells, denoted by S 0 , · · · , S 7 ∈ {1, −1}, and each cell is connected with other cells via eight synaptic weights w ij ∈ {1, 0, −1}, among which only three are non-zeros. The synaptic weights between two connected cells are identical: ∀ i, j = 0 ∼ 7, w ij = w ji . The neural network evolves according to the following rule:
where
Note that S i = 0 holds at all times. Now, let us see how the chaotic cipher works with the above CNN. Without loss of generality, assume that f = {f (i)} N −1 i=0 is the plaintext signal, where f (i) denotes the i-th plain-byte and N is the plaintext size in byte. Accordingly, denote the ciphertext by
i=0 , where f ′ (i) is a double-precision floating-point number corresponding to the plain-byte f (i). The encryption procedure can be briefly depicted as follows 1 .
-The secret key includes the initial states of the 8 neural cells in the CNN, S 0 (0), · · · , S 7 (0), the initial condition x(0), and the control parameter r of the following chaotic tent map:
where r should be very close to 2 to ensure the chaoticity of the tent map. -The initial procedure: 1) in double-precision floating-point arithmetic, run the tent map from x(0) for 128 times before the encryption starts; 2) run the CNN for 128/8 = 16 times (under the control of the tent map, as discussed below in the last step of the encryption procedure); 3) set x(0) and S 0 (0), · · · , S 7 (0) to be the new states of the tent map and the CNN. -The encryption procedure: for the i-th plain-byte f (i), perform the following steps to get the ciphertext f ′ (i): • evolve the CNN for one step to get its new states: S 0 (i), · · · , S 7 (i);
• in double-precision floating-point arithmetic, run the chaotic tent map for 8 times to get 8 chaotic states:
• generate 8 bits by extracting the 4-th bits of the 8 chaotic states:
, and then
, update all the three non-zero weights of the i-th neural cell and the three mirror weights as follows:
The decryption procedure is similar to the above one with the following decryption formula:
3 The Chosen-Plaintext Attack
In chosen-plaintext attacks, it is assumed that the attacker can intentionally choose a number of plaintexts to try to break the secret key or its equivalent [9] . Although it was claimed that the chaotic cipher under study can resist this kind of attacks [5, Sec. 4], our cryptanalysis shows that such a claim is not true. By choosing two plaintexts, f 1 and f 2 , satisfying
one can derive two masking sequences as equivalent keys for decryption. Before introducing the chosen-plaintext attack, three lemmas are given, which are useful in the following discussions.
Proof. This lemma can be proved under two conditions. i) 
Given two plain-bytes f 1 (i) = f 2 (i) and the corresponding cipher-blocks f
. It is true that 0 < ∆ f1,2 < 256. Thus, one has
Because f 1 (i) ⊕ B(i) and f 2 (i) ⊕ B(i) are 8-bit integers and ∆ f1,2 = 0, from Lemma 2, one of the following facts is true:
For the above two equations, when f 1 (i) = f 2 (i) is satisfied, two possible values of B(i) can be uniquely derived according to the following theorem. Proof. Since a =b, one has b ⊕ x = a ⊕ x. Thus, by substituting y = a ⊕ x and y = a ⊕ x = b ⊕ x into (a ⊕ x) − (b ⊕ x) = c, one can get y −ȳ = c, which is equivalent to y =ȳ + c. Let y = 7 i=0 y i · 2 i , and consider the following three conditions, respectively. 1) When i = 0, from y 0 ≡ (ȳ 0 + c 0 ) (mod 2), one can immediately get c 0 = 1. Note the following two facts: i) when y 0 = 0,ȳ 0 + c 0 = 2, a carry bit is generated for the next bit, so y 1 ≡ (ȳ 1 + c 1 + 1) (mod 2) and c 1 = 0; ii) when y 0 = 1, y 0 + c 0 = 1, no carry bit is generated, so y 1 ≡ (ȳ 1 + c 1 ) (mod 2) and c 1 = 1. Apparently, it is always true that y 0 = c 1 . Also, a carry bit is generated if c 1 = 0 is observed.
2) When i = 1, if there exists a carry bit, set c
, one can immediately get c ′ 1 = 1. Then, using the same method shown in the first condition, one has y 1 = c 2 and knows whether or not a carry bit is generated for i = 2. Repeat the above procedure for i = 2 ∼ 6, one can uniquely determine that y i = c i+1 .
3) When i = 7, it is always true that the carry bit does not occur, so c 
Proof. Since c +c = 255, one has c ′ = 256 − c =c + 1. Let c = 
For any one of the two candidate values of B(i), one can further get an equivalent chaotic statex(8i + 7) from B(i), f (i) and f ′ (i) as follows:
With B(i) andx(8i + 7), the encryption formula Eq. (3) becomes
and the decryption formula Eq. (4) becomes
Assume thatx 1 (8i + 7) andx 2 (8i + 7) are calculated by Eq. (8), from B 1 (i) and B 2 (i), respectively. Then, we have the following proposition. Proposition 1. (B 1 (i),x 1 (8i + 7) ) and (B 2 (i),x 2 (8i + 7)) are equivalent for the above encryption procedure Eq. (9), though only one corresponds to the correct value generated from the secret key. That is,
+ 128) (mod 256), which immediately leads to the following fact: ((f (i) ⊕ B 1 (i)) +x 1 (8i + 7)) ≡ ((f (i) ⊕ B 2 (i)) +x 2 (8i + 7)) (mod 256). Thus, this proposition is proved.
⊓ ⊔ Considering the symmetry of the encryption and decryption procedures, the above proposition immediately leads to a conclusion that (B 1 (i),x 1 (8i + 7)) and (B 2 (i),x 2 (8i + 7)) are also equivalent for the decryption procedure Eq. (10).
From the above analyses, with two chosen plaintexts f 1 and f 2 =f 1 , one can get the following two sequences:
i=0 , ∀ i = 0 ∼ N − 1, one can use either (B 1 (i),x 1 (8i + 7)) or (B 2 (i),x 2 (8i + 7)) as an equivalent of the secret key to decrypt the i-th plain-byte f (i), following Eq. (10). This means that the chaotic cipher under study is not sufficiently secure against the chosen-plaintext attack.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed attack, some experiments have been performed for image encryption, with secret key r = 1.99, x(0) = 0.41 and [S 0 (0), · · · , S 7 (0)] = [1, −1, 1, −1, 1, −1, 1, −1] . One plain-image "Lenna" of size 256 × 256 is chosen as f 1 and another plain-image is manually generated as follows: f 2 =f 1 . The two plain-images and their cipher-images are shown in Fig. 1 . With the two chosen plain-images, two sequences, {B 1 (i),
, are generated by using the abovementioned algorithm. The first ten elements of the two sequences are given in Table 1 .
can be used to recover the plain-byte f (i). As a result, the whole plain-image ("Peppers" in this test) can be recovered as shown in Fig. 1f . 
Conclusion
In this paper, the security of a chaotic cipher based on clipped neural network has been analyzed in detail. It is found that the scheme can be effectively broken with only two chosen plain-images. Both theoretical and experimental analyses have been given to support the proposed attack. Therefore, this scheme is not suggested for applications that requires a high level of security. 
